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1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General overview of the pension  
system 
 
The Finnish pension system is divided into statutory and voluntary pension 
schemes. In the overall picture the statutory schemes play the primary 
role. Voluntary pensions, which in principle could be employer-based,  
industry-wide supplementary pensions or individual pension plans, are of 
minor importance only. 
 
The statutory pension system comprises of 2 tiers: 
• national pension scheme, which is residence-based; 
• earnings-related pension schemes, which cover the economically  
      active population. 
 
The earnings-related scheme is the dominant pension arrangement, 
while the national pension scheme has a subsidiary role.  
Both pension systems cover 4 risks: 
• old age;  
• disability; 
• death of the family earner; 
• long-term unemployment of older workers; 
 
The latter type of pension can be considered as one of the peculiari-
ties of the Finnish pension system. 
The social-political objective of the national pension is to guarantee 
a minimum income in cases where the person has no earnings-related 
pension or the earnings-related pension is very small, thus giving security 
to persons who are outside the active working life. 
The aim of the earnings-related pension is seen as to provide  
replacement income, which is sufficient for consumption comparable both 
to that of the person’s own working years and to the current workers’  
consumption. Thus the scheme aims to achieve simultaneously redistribu-
tion over the individual life-span as well as intergenerational equity. 
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1.2 Benefits 
1.2.1 National pension 
 
The qualifying age for the national old age pension is 65, which is equal 
for men and women. However, early retirement is possible from the age  
of 60. 
 
The amount of the national pension depends on a number of variables: 
- other pension income of the beneficiary; 
- marital status; 
- place of residence; 
- length of residence in Finland. 
 
A full national pension1 of 446 Euro for a single person and 391  
Euro for a married person (in 2000) is paid out, if the beneficiaries other 
pension income is below a certain limit (43 Euro in 2000). If the other pen-
sion income exceeds this limit, the national pension is reduced by half of 
the difference between the earnings and the limit. If the other pension in-
come exceeds 914 Euro for a single person and 804 Euro for a married 
person (in 2000), the national pension is not paid at all. 
National pension can be topped-up with a housing allowance (up  
to 85% of the share of the housing costs exceeding the amount of  
self-responsibility). 
 
 
1 Local municipalities are divided into 2 groups depending on the cost of living. This is the 
   amount, if the person resides in the group of local municipality with higher living costs. In the 
   other group, the amounts of the full national pension are respectively 427 and 375 Euros. 
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1.2.2 Earnings-related pension2 
 
The old-age pension is granted to a person:  
- who is in pension age (in general 65), and 
- whose employment relationship has terminated. 
 
Early retirement is possible from 60 to 64 with 0.4 % reduction in  
the amount of pension for each month. From the other side, the old age 
pension may also be deferred beyond the age of 65, with subsequent 
pension increase of 0.6 % for each month.  
Part-time pension may be granted to a person aged 58-643 who  
reduce their working hours and take up part-time work (with at least 16, 
but no more than 28 weekly working hours). 
Unemployment pension may be granted to a person aged 60 or 
over, who has received unemployment allowance for the maximum period 
(500 days with certain extensions). 
Disability pension can be granted if the work capacity of the person 
has been reduced for at least 1 year. 
Survivors’ pension is paid in case of the death of the family earner to 
the children and the surviving spouse. 
 
Pensions are calculated according to the formula: 
 
 
Pension = accrual rate  x  insurance period  x  reference wage 
 
 
The accrual rate is 1.5 % between ages 23-59 and 2.5 % between 60-65. 
The pensionable wage (reference wage) is aggregated over the last 
10 years of the employment contract. 
There is no fixed minimum nor ceiling on pensions. There, however 
is a maximum replacement rate, which is 60% of the pensionable wage. 
 
2 The benefit rules are described for the TEL (employees) scheme. For other schemes, some  
   of the rules could be different, e.g. in the TaEL (artists) scheme it is not required to stop  
   working to get pension.   
3 The age limit for part-time pension has been temporarily lowered to 56 until the end of 2002. 
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Pension rights and benefits are index-linked. More precisely there 
are 2 indexes: one used during working years depends 50-50 on wages 
and consumer prices, after the age of 65 the weights are respectively  
20-80.   
 
 
1.3 Administration of the pension schemes 
 
The national pension scheme is administrated by the Social Insurance 
Institution (KELA).   
The earnings-related pension system is comprised of 9 sub-
schemes, covering separately private and public sector employers and 
different occupational groups. The sub-schemes are titled according to the 
relevant legal acts. 
 
 
Table 1. Different sub-schemes of the Finnish earnings-related pension  
                  system.  
 
 
Legal acts regulation the earnings-related  
pension schemes 
Commonly used 
abbreviation 
 
 
Private sector 
 
       The Employees’ Pensions Act TEL 
       The Temporary Employees’ Pension Act LEL 
       The Pension Act for Performing Artists and Certain Other   
       Employee Groups 
TaEL 
       The Seamen’s Pension Act MEL 
       The Self-Employed Persons’ Pensions Act YEL 
       The Farmers’ Pension Act MYEL 
Public sector  
       The State Employees’ Pensions Act  VEL 
       The Local Government Employees’ Pension Act   KVTEL 
       The Evangelist Lutheran Church Pensions Act KiEL 
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The administration of the earnings-related pension system is decen-
tralized. The private sector employers, in principle, are able to choose 
which pension institution they want to use, either a private insurance  
company (Varma-Sampo, Pension-Fennia, Ilmarinen, Pensions-Alandia, 
Eläke-Tapiola, Verdandi), a company pension fund (37 different funds  
in 1999) or an industry-wide pension fund (8 different funds). For some of 
the smaller schemes (temporary employees, farmers, artists) separate 
pension funds are established. 
Earnings-related pension schemes for the public sector are handled 
by public institutions: the Local Government Pension Institution, the State 
Treasury and the National Ecclesiastical Board.  
Despite the decentralized organization, the scheme is co-ordinated 
on the central level. The co-ordination task lies with the Central Pension 
Security Institute, which handles the following common matters: 
• maintains central registers; 
• settles expenditures between the pension institutions; 
• provides instructions on application of the legislation; 
• has certain decision-making powers concerning the applicable  
legislation. 
 
 
1.4 Financing and contributions 
 
National pensions are financed on pay-as-you-go basis, revenues coming 
from 2 sources: 
- an ear-marked tax-like contributions, which are paid by employers 
(45% of the total revenues) and  
- general taxation (55% of the total revenues). 
 
The system of earnings-related pensions is financed from insurance 
contributions, paid by employers and employees. The contribution rate is 
determined annually on the basis of pre-set rules. 
The system is based on the principle of partial funding, combining 
funded elements and pay-as-you-go financing. It should be stressed  
however that the funding is not discretionary. It is clearly predefined which 
components of the system are funded and which are financed PAYG.  
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The following elements are financed with the pay-as-you-go mechanism (a 
pooled component in the contribution rate): 
- the index adjustments; 
- survivors’ pensions;  
- part-time pensions; 
- non-funded parts of the old-age pension; 
- non-funded part of the disability and unemployment pension. 
 
The funding rules of the system are: 
1. Old age pensions: funding takes place between ages 23 -54, when 
one third (i.e. 0.5% of wage) of the annual accrual rate of 1.5% is  
funded; 
2. Disability and unemployment pensions: up to 80% of the pension is 
funded in the year of contingency. 
 
It shall be noted that the funding affects only the calculation and the 
size of contributions. The funds are collective (not individual accounts) and 
the yield of funds does not influence the size of the individual pension.  
The contribution rate for the earnings-related pension varies quite 
substantially between the different sub-schemes - from 10.4 % in the  
farmers’ scheme up to 31.5% in the church scheme. 
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Table 2. The contribution rates for the earnings-related pension scheme  
                  in 2001. 
 
 
Earnings-related 
pension scheme 
The contribution rate Earnings limit 
(floor) 
 
Private sector 
  
  Employees (TEL) 21.8% if less than 50  
employees; 
15.7-27.7% if 50 or more 
employees, the rate de-
pends on the age and sex 
of employees  
21.1% (average, including 
the average contribution 
rebate 0.8% of wages 
1256 FIM (211 Euro) 
per month 
  Temporary   
  employees (LEL) 
21.8% 
 
 
  Artists (TaEL) 17.0%   
  Seamen (MEL) 20.0% (divided between the 
insured and the employer) 
 
  Self-employed (YEL) 21.0% (base).  
18.7% (average) 
30134 FIM (5065  
Euro) per year 
  Farmers (MYEL) 21.0% (base) 
10.4% (average) 
15067 FIM (2532  
Euro) per year 
 
Public sector 
  
  State employees 
  (VEL) 
22.6%(average)   
  Local Government 
  Employees  
  (KVTEL) 
26.7% (average)  
  Church (KiEL) 31.5% 
 
 
Source: The Central Pension Security Institute 
 
 
 
In the main, private sector employees’ (TEL) scheme the total  
average contribution rate is currently 21.1 per cent, the employee's share 
being 4.5 percentage points of the wage. Except seamen, in all other 
schemes the employee’s share is the same as in the TEL scheme. 
The Government subsidizes to a small extent the schemes for  
self-employed persons and seamen. Farmers’ pensions are however fi-
nanced by the Government up to 80 per cent. 
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1.5 Assets of pension institutions 
 
Assets of the pension institutions are invested in: 
- debt securities (bonds); 
- real estate; 
- shares; 
- loans. 
 
The assets should be invested safely and productively. In order to 
diversify investments and thus minimize the investment risks the legisla-
tion of the insurance companies and the insurance funds includes per-
centage limits for the investments. In addition the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health approves annually a minimum yield that the pension 
institutions must obtain on their investments. The minimum rate of return 
is currently 5.75%. If the actual yield exceeds this minimum, the pension 
institutions may to a certain extent choose to strengthen their solvency or 
to refund  
a part of the collected contributions to their clients (employers and  
employees). In 2000, the average contribution rebate was 0.6% of wages.  
The rebate is shared between the employers and the employees. All  
employees get half of the average rebate but the rebate of the employer  
is individual, being proportional to each client’s pension reserves in the 
managing pension institution. The solvency limi s are institution specific and depend on the  
diversification of investments. From the other side, the better is the  
solvency of the institution, the freer it is to choose the investment objects. 
Investment activities are supervised by the Insurance Supervision  
Authority. 
A private-sector employer is allowed to borrow back the part of the 
pension contribution that is not immediately needed to finance current 
pensions. The interest of the loan depends on the duration of the loan, the 
securities and the market interest rate. 
Assets of pension institutions accounted for 67 billion Euros or 55 % 
of GDP in 1999 (Lassila, Valkonen 2000). 
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1.6 Guarantees 
 
Accrued rights are protected against insolvency of the pension institution. 
There is a statutory joint liability of pension institutions. However, there is 
no pre-funded guarantee mechanism. In case of insolvency of the pension 
institution, necessary finances to cover the pension liabilities are collected 
from a specific increase in the contribution rate.   
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2 EVALUATION OF THE  
EXISTING SYSTEM 
2.1 Are pensions adequate?  
 
Finland is well known over the world for its equal distribution of incomes. 
While 3.8% of the total population live in relative poverty (defined as 50% 
of the median income), the poverty affects only 1.8% of persons over 654.  
The share of pensioner households among the poor has stayed very 
low5. The income available to pensioner households averages 85% of the 
income of other households. 
As to the subjective perception of personal well-being, 8.5% of  
the total population perceived themselves as poor, whereas only 1.8% of 
persons over 65 considered themselves poor in 19956. However slight 
changes in this respect have occurred over the last 5 years. In 2000 the 
respective figures were 6% (of total population) and 3.7% (of persons over 
65). 
There is no legally pre-established minimum level neither for the  
national nor for the earnings-related pension. The defined objective of the 
national pension is to provide a minimum guarantee for the old-age,  
disability and death of the breadwinner, but it is to be noted that this  
guarantee is proportional to the years lived in Finland. 
 
 
 
4 Data of Statistics Finland. 
5 www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/finland/social.htm. 
6 Data presented by Veli-Matti Ritakallio from Turku University. 
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2.2 Is the coverage sufficient? 
 
The Finnish pension schemes are characterized by a broad coverage. 
The scope of the national pension scheme is universal, as the right 
to national pension accrues on the basis of residence. All persons  
aged over 16 and living permanently in Finland are insured on the basis of 
residence. 
All economically active persons (employees and self-employed) are 
covered by the earnings-related pension scheme on a mandatory basis. 
The obligation to take out insurance lies with the employer. The coverage 
extends to all employees and civil servants regardless of the length of the 
employment contract or the amount of the salary. 
The self-employed persons have to take out insurance for the  
earnings-related pension when the self-employment has continued for four 
months and when the income earned from self-employment exceeds an 
established minimum (5065 Euro annually in 2001). 
 
Table 3. Persons affiliated to different sub-schemes of the earnings- 
                   related pension system (1998).  
 
 
Earnings-related 
pension scheme 
Number of  
affiliates 
Share from the total num-
ber of affiliates 
 
Private sector 
  
  Employees (TEL)       1100000           51.7 % 
  Temporary   
   employees (LEL) 
          80000             3.8 % 
  Artists (TaEL)           25000             1.2 % 
  Seamen (MEL)             7000             0.3 % 
  Self-employed (YEL)         155000             7.3 % 
  Farmers (MYEL)         115000             5.4 % 
Public sector   
  State employees (VEL)         185000             8.7 % 
  Local Government 
  Employees (KVTEL) 
        445000           20.9 % 
  Church (KiEL)           15000              0.7 % 
 
Total       2127000         100.0 % 
 
  Source: The Central Pension Security Institute 
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While the economically active population (employed and unemplo-
yed aged 16-64) in 1997 was 2420000 persons, about 88% were affiliated 
to the earnings-related pension scheme. From the total number of  
affiliates, 95% were active contributors (Lehmus, Pietiläinen, Pellinen 
2000). 
The neglect of payment of contributions has been attributed to  
certain fields of business, like construction, catering and taxi-driving.  
However, no systematic avoidance of liabilities is observed. 
 
 
2.3 Are pensions generous?  
 
The total pension expenditures (national pensions and earnings-related 
pensions together) were 12.6% of GDP, which is about the EU average7. 
Expenditures on earnings-related pensions accounted for 9.7% of GDP in 
1997. When comparing these figures with Estonian pension expenditures, 
attention shall be drawn to the fact that in Finland gross expenditures  
on pensions do not directly convert into the net disposable income for 
pensioners. In Finland pensions (except national pensions) are subject to 
an income tax and pensioners are further liable to pay health insurance 
contributions. 
The average total pension was 5440 FIM in 1999, while the average 
earnings were 11625 FIM. From this, the average gross replacement rate 
is 46.8 % and the average net replacement rate 56.6%8. 
According to the pension formula, the target replacement rate in  
the earning-related pension scheme is 60% of wages. Unfortunately, data 
were not available to show the actual replacement rates (the amount  
of granted pension to the reference wage) of persons who are currently 
retiring9. 
 
7 Data of the Central Pension Security Institute. 
8 Data presented by Marjukka Hietaniemi (the Central Pension Security Institute). 
9 As the earnings-related pension was established in 1962, the system is only approaching its  
   maturation. 
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The earnings-related pension and the national pension together  
offer a rather high income for the majority of pensioners. The combined 
net replacement rate exceeds 100% for persons earning less than 5000 
FIM (840 Euro) per month (Tuomisto 1999). 
 
 
2.4 Is the system efficient? 
 
The earnings-related pension scheme is divided into a number of  
sub-schemes (see above), each with certain particularities both in respect 
of benefit rules as well as the rate of contributions. This makes the overall 
picture complex and fragmented. However, portability of rights acquired 
under different sub-schemes is not a problem.    
  
 
2.5 Is the system well-targeted? 
 
The number of pensioners in 1998 was 1166200, which is 22.6% of the 
total population. The share of persons over 64 years in the total population 
at the same time was 14.6% (the EU15 average 16%). Considering that 
the national pensions system secures universal coverage for everybody 
from the age of 65, it can be seen that pension recipients under the age of 
65 form around 8% of the total population.  
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Table 4. The old age dependency ratio in Finland compared to the EU  
                  average. 
 
 
 
 Old age dependency ratio  
 
 Finland 0.25 
 EU 0.27 
 
  Source: The Central Pension Security Institute, Eurostat 
 
 
 
The old age dependency ratio (number of persons aged 65 or more 
divided by the number of persons aged 20-64) in Finland is below the EU 
average, mostly explained by the fact that different from the other Nordic 
countries, life expectancy in Finland is below the EU average. 
The average actual retirement age10 in 1997 was 57.6 (57.2 for men, 
58.2 for women) while the median age was 60,1. This was considerably 
lower than the statutory pension age of 65, in particular on the account of 
early retirement pensions and unemployment pensions. 
The life expectancy at the age of 65 is currently about 17.3 years 
(Lindell 1999). 
More than a third (40.2% males) of the population aged 55-64  
receive disability pensions. 8.3% of the same cohort are recipients of  
unemployment pensions. 
The different types of early retirement pensions, providing possibili-
ties for early exists from the labor market, is one characteristic feature of 
the Finnish pension system. These pensions have been used as a way  
to adjust to the abrupt changes in the economy (Pietiläinen 1999). The 
long-term sustainability of these policies is clearly under the question 
mark.  
There seems to be a wide consensus that people should not retire 
as early as they currently do. It shall be acknowledged that the Finnish 
 
10 Calculations of Mikko Pellinen and Jari Kannisto (the Central Pension Security Institute)  
     and Timo Korpela (Merita Life-Insurance) 
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Government has adopted a National Program on Ageing Workers (for  
the years 1998-2002) aiming to help older workers to stay in work. More 
concretely, the Government aims to increase the average age of exiting 
from the labor market by 2-3 years in the longer term. 
 
 
2.6 Is the system equitable? 
 
The majority of pensioners receive both national pension and the  
earnings-related pension. 112 000 pensioners (9.6%) receive only the  
earnings-related pension11. From the other side, 150 000 persons (12.9%) 
receive only national pension.  
 
 
Table 5. The number of pensioners (1998).  
 
 
Type of pension The number of 
pensioners  
The share from the 
total number 
 
    National pension only 150 000 12.9 % 
    National pension and    
    earnings-related pension 
904 200 77.5 % 
    Earnings-related pension only 112 000 9.6 % 
   
Total        1 166 200         100.0% 
 
  Source: The Social Insurance Institution. 
 
 
 
 
11 All pensioners received a basic amount (about 400 FIM/month) of the national pension until  
    1995. Pensioners who had been granted a national pension continue to receive this  
     pension, but the basic amount is decreasing for every year and should be abolished in  
     2001.  
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Finns have continuously monitored the public opinion towards the 
pension system. A survey conducted in 1999 revealed that 53% of res-
pondents considered the present pension system fair, as a whole. 85% of 
the population considered it justified that the pension is determined accor-
ding to the earnings from the former work, while the supporters of a flat-
rate pension system form a minority (Lehmus, Pietiläinen, Pellinen 2000).  
 
 
2.7 Is the system sustainable? 
 
The pension expenditure is expected to increase from the current level of 
about 12% of GDP to about 16% of GDP by 2050 according to simulations 
conducted by the EU Ecofin working group (Economic Policy Committee 
2000). The peak level would actually be reached already around 2040. 
Simulations by a research group from the Research Institute of the 
Finnish Economy (ETLA) show that with the base scenario of 3% real 
yield on accumulated funds, the total contribution rate to finance pension 
expenditures would have to increase to the level of about 32% by 2050 
(see Chart in the Annex). However, the increase in contributions would be 
very slow until 2010. Higher fund yield would ease the pressure on contri-
butions. With 4% real yield, the total contribution would rise to 29% by 
2050. The greatest impact in this respect would have an increase in the 
effective retirement age by 3 years (Klaavo, Salonen, Tenkula, Vanne 
1999). 
It is difficult to forecast the political sustainability of increasing  
contributions. According to recent opinion polls, about 75% of Finns are 
prepared to pay higher contributions for their earnings-related pensions, if 
the benefits remain at the present level. However, 58% of the respondents 
believe that there will be a reduction in the benefits in the future (Lehmus, 
Pietiläinen, Pellinen 2000). 
 
 
2.8 Does the private sector play a role in  
      pensions provision?  
 
The Finnish earnings-related pension system presents a particular public-
private mix. Although it is largely considered as a public system, the direct 
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administration of the scheme both in the accumulation stage and in the 
pay-out stage lies with private insurance companies and pension funds. 
It shall be noted however, that the margin of competition between 
the different pension providers is limited as the product is legally defined. 
The pension providers compete on administrative costs and try to attract 
customers (employers) through contribution rate rebate if their yield  
on investments is higher than the minimum established by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. 
It is possible to top-up the statutory earnings-related pension by a 
supplementary pension based on collective agreement. These supple-
mentary arrangements are mostly employer-specific and take the form of 
a group life insurance. In the private sector about 20% of the employees 
are covered by the employer-arranged supplementary pensions.  
About 5% of all employed persons have taken up individual volunta-
ry supplementary pension insurance policies (Lehmus, Pietiläinen,  
Pellinen 2000). The low figure can be explained by the fact, that there is 
no absolute ceiling on benefits in the statutory earnings-related pension 
system. From the other side, the lack of ceiling can be seen as a measure 
to increase cohesion in the statutory pension scheme.  
 
 
2.9 Is the system distortive? 
 
The contribution rate to finance the earnings-related pension scheme has 
increased from 13% in 1980 to above 20% over the 20 year time period 
(see Chart in the Annex), clearly adding to the labor costs.  
In 1993 employees’ contribution was introduced12, with the declared 
aim inter alia to strengthen the employees’ sense of economic responsibi-
lity towards the pension system. 
The current total average contribution rate in the main TEL  
(employee) scheme is 21.1%, but further increases are expected in the 
 
12 initially the rate was 3%. 
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future. It is stipulated in the law that any future increases in the contributi-
on rate have to be shared 50-50 between employers and employees. 
Considering the pension formula, the incentives to contribute to the 
pension system can still be described as strong due to the fact that the 
earnings-related pension is directly linked to the pensionable wage.  
The age-specific accrual rate provides incentives to stay in the labor 
market for persons in pre-retirement ages 60-65 years, as the annual  
accrual rate is 2.5% compared to 1.5% at younger ages. However, this 
measure would not affect persons with a long work history because of the 
60% ceiling on the replacement rate. Also, the pension is not accruing 
after the age of 65. 
The minimum pension guarantee through the way of calculation of 
the national pension integrates the system of national pensions with the 
earnings-related pension scheme and ensures that there are incentives to 
contribute to the system also for the low-income earners. 
From the other side, generous unemployment-related pensions 
(compared to the OECD average) are believed to have contributed to  
lower the average participation rates amongst older workers of about 3.6% 
(Blöndal, Scarpetta 1998).  
 
 
2.10 Is the system administratively  
        effective? 
 
The administration of the earnings-related pension system is decentrali-
zed, but this is not a problem for the pension applicant. The applicant has 
to submit just one pension application, which is handled by the pension 
institution were the person was last insured. The institution then has to 
obtain the necessary information from the central register of the Central 
Pension Security Institute on other employment contracts and periods of 
self-employment, where the person concerned has accrued pension 
rights. The pension rights, which the person has acquired from different 
employment contracts are combined into one single pension, which is paid 
out by the last insurer.  The same pension application is also forwarded  
to the Social Insurance Institute, which grants and pays out the national 
pension. 
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The average handling time for pension claims is 55 days. 
Administrative costs of the Social Insurance Institution have been 
around 3%, while the administrative costs of the earnings-related pension 
scheme around 4%. 
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3 EVALUATION OF RECENT 
CHANGES AND REFORMS IN 
THE PENSION SYSTEM 
3.1 Reforms undertaken in 1990s 
 
The Finnish pension system has been relatively stable over the last 2  
decades as no major structural changes have been made. However,  
the severe recession in 1990s forced to cut labor costs and outlined the 
underlying problems of long-term sustainability of the pension system.  
A number of parametric changes have been implemented in 1990s  
(see Table 6), most importantly: 
1) the pension age increased from 63 to 65 (public sector); 
2) the target replacement rate reduced from 66% to 60% (public sector); 
3) the annual accrual rate reduced from 2.2% to 1.5% (public sector); 
4) access to early retirement inhibited by increasing the age limit from 55 
to 58; 
5) the indexation rules changed (bent index); 
6) the time period for calculation of the reference wage was increased 
from 4 to 10 years. 
 
These modifications have been commonly perceived as a “flexibility” 
of the system and as a feature showing the ability of the system to adapt 
to the changing circumstances (Lassila, Valkonen 2000).  
From the other side, these parametric reforms have had quite  
substantial cost containing effect (see Table 7). Without these reforms, the 
contribution rate would have had to increase by 8 percentage points over 
the next 30 years. 
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Table 6. The main policy changes in 1990-200013. 
 
Year  imple- 
mented 
Measure 
1990 Eligibility rules for surviving spouse’s pension were tightened and equal treatment of 
men and women implemented. 
 
1993 
 
Employee's pension contribution was introduced. 
The public sector pension scheme was curtailed in line with the rules of the private 
sector scheme: 
- the retirement age was raised from 63 to 65 years.  
- the yearly accrual rate of pensions was lowered from 2.2 % to 1.5 %.  
- for new employees the target replacement rate falls from 66 to 60 %.  
 
1994 
 
The index adjustment (1.3 %) in pensions was not implemented. 
Agreement to divide equally the future increases in the contribution rate between em-
ployers and employees. 
The employee's pension contribution is deducted from the pensionable 
wage. 
The lower age limit for individual early retirement pensions was raised from 55 to 58 
years.  
The age limit was lowered for part-time pensions from 60 to 58 years. 
The accrual rate for employees aged 60-64 raised from 1.5 % to 2.5 %. 
 
1996 
 
Pensionable earnings are calculated on the basis wages of the last 10 years in every 
employment contract are used instead of 4 years.  
The implementation is gradual. The transition period ends in 2005. 
The accrual rate for the post-contingency period in early retirement pensions was 
lowered from 1.5 % to 1.2 % in age bracket 50-60 years and to 0.8 % in the age 
bracket 60-65. 
A two-index system was introduced. During working age an index consisting of an 
average of consumer prices and wages (half-way index) is used, as earlier, but in the 
index of paid pensions the weight of wages was reduced from 0.5 to 0.2 and the 
weight of consumer prices was raised from 0.5 to 0.8 (bent index).   
Means-testing for eligibility to the national pension was extended. 
 
1997 
 
The rules of pension funding were changed. The link between current contributions 
and the current yield of pension funds was cut, enabling an increase in risky invest-
ments without changing the forward-looking funding principle. 
 
1998 The lower age limit for part-time pension was lowered temporarily from 58 to 56 years. 
 
2000 The unemployment pension was cut. 
The pre-funding of unemployment pensions was increased and the pre-funding of the 
disability pensions was reduced in order to equalize the costs for the employer of using 
these alternative channels to reduce its labor force. 
The lower age limit for individual early retirement pensions was raised from 58 to 60 
years. 
 
13 Adopted from Lassila, Valkonen 2000. 
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Table 7. The expenditure impacts of the main pension policy measures  
                  in 1990’s14. 
 
 
Measure Year of imple-
mentation 
Change in expenditures, 
% of total wage bill in 
2030 
 
 
Surviving spouse’ pension 
 
1990 
 
- 0.8 
Public sector pensions 1993 - 2.7 
Eligibility ages 1994 - 0.7 
Pensionable wage 1996 - 0.4 
Accrual rate for the post-
contingency period 
1996 
 
- 1.5 
Bent index 1996 - 1.5 
Means-testing of national pen-
sion  
1996 - 0.8 
Total  - 8.4 
 
 
 
An important change in respect of the solvency rules was made in 
1997, allowing for pension institutions to develop additional reserves  
and direct more investments to riskier instruments, such as domestic  
and foreign shares. Earlier a significant part of assets were directed to 
Government bonds and loans to the client firms, with relatively modest 
yields. The share of domestic and foreign stocks in the private sector  
pension institutions portfolios has increased from 11.9 % in 1997 to 27.7 
% in 1999. 
Since 1999 buffer funds have been developed in the earnings-
related pension system in order to control sudden disturbances caused by 
recession. This measure is linked to the Finland’s participation in the  
European Economic and Monetary Union, as during a recession the EMU 
requirements would otherwise be difficult to meet. The development of 
 
14 Adopted from Lassila, Valkonen 2000. 
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buffer funds would entail that in the period of strong economic growth the 
contribution rate could be raised somewhat and during recession lowered. 
 
 
3.2 Overall assessment of the current  
      Finnish pension system 
 
From my perspective, the main strengths of the Finnish pension system 
could be summarized as follows: 
1) The system provides high level social protection combined with broad 
coverage and a proper structure of incentives. The earnings-related 
pension system includes strong link between benefits and contribu-
tions, while the integrated minimum guarantees of the national and 
earnings-related pension schemes ensures incentives also for the low-
income earners. 
2) The system enjoys large public support and acceptance. 
3) The financial position of the system is relatively good in the European 
comparison due to partial funding with private fund management and 
the high rate of return on the accumulated funds over the last years. 
4) The administration of the pension system is efficient (which makes up 
its fragmentation). 
 
As weaknesses of the system, I see the following: 
1) Fragmentation of the earnings-related pension scheme into 9 sub-
schemes each with certain particularities both in respect of the benefit 
rules as well as contribution rates, while the differences can not be  
always justified on rational bases. 
2) The system is too much employer-focused. The individual, while 
paying his/her share of contributions, has no choice over the pension 
institution for managing his contributions, neither does the higher yield 
from investments increase his pension. The main choices available in 
the scheme are made by the employer. From the other side, the  
employer is the principal risk-taker, who is either to win or to loose 
from the choices made. 
3) The system includes too many options for an early exit from the labor 
market, although it is clear that it is not only the parameters of the 
pension system, which influence the demand and supply for the older 
workforce. 
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4) Increasing contribution rates - a typical problem in the defined-benefit 
pension scheme.  
 
3.3 Future developments 
 
A number of ideas on how to improve the current Finnish pension system 
and how to secure it against adverse demographic and economic  
developments have been suggested both by academic researchers and 
by people working in the pension administration. 
 
The list of suggested reform ideas includes the following: 
1) General simplification of the earnings-related pension system by  
merging the different laws into a single one and increasing transpa-
rency of the system. 
2) Introduction of the Swedish-type life expectancy coefficient for  
adjusting the accrued pension (Lindell 1999). 
3) Indexation of pensions with the total wage bill index. 
4) Changing the accrual rules to take into account the fragmentation of 
working life and fixed-term work contracts. 
5) Linking the pre-funded amount of pension to current births rates,  
based on the observation that from the perspectives of pension  
expenditures, uncertainty about the future birth rates are more impor-
tant than the uncertainty about longevity (Lassila, Valkonen 2000). 
 
It seems very likely that the future reforms will concentrate on  
modifications of the current system rather than on a complete overhaul.   
Currently two expert groups work on different reform proposals.  
The Government has established a Committee on Social Protection 
Expenditure and its Financing. The Committee is called to investigate  
the likely development of expenditure for social protection and to find ways 
of sustaining the financing in the long run. Although the committee’s  
tasks are not limited to pensions matters only, pensions receive a large 
attention. The Committee consists of representatives from the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labor, 
organizations related to social insurance, regional authorities and labor 
market organizations 
The second group is initiated by the labor market organizations and 
develops policy initiative in particular on the earnings-related pension sys-
tem. 
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The Finns are known for their good analytical capacities and  
problem-solving attitudes, which leaves confidence that the challenges of 
the pension system will be properly tackled. 
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1 INTRODUCTION    
 
The reform of the pension system in Estonia can be divided  
in the following main steps: 
1990-92 the first attempt to introduce a national pension system and 
the establishment of  the Social Fund financed by social tax. 
This step resulted in flat rate benefits 
1993 gradual increase of the retirement age and the introduction of 
a new pension formula stipulated by the State Allowance Act 
(with several amendments) 
1997  elaboration and approval of the “Concept Paper of the  
Pension Reform“  
 
Since 1997, the Estonian Government has been reforming its  
pension system, based on this concept paper elaborated by the Social 
Security Reform Commission. The paper suggested the introduction of a 
three-pillar pension scheme, where the pillars have the following meaning: 
I pillar - compulsory state managed pension scheme financed on a  
pay-as-you go basis. 
II pillar - compulsory privately managed funded pension scheme 
III pillar- voluntary private pension schemes. 
 
The reform of the first pillar was initiated with the adoption of  
the new Law on Social Tax, which entered into force on January 1 1999 
followed by the Law on State Pension Insurance which took effect on April 
1 2000. The second pillar is envisaged for 2002, but deviating from  
the original plan this scheme is suggested to be mandatory only for those 
currently under the age of 18 and voluntary for all other employees. The 
legal framework for the third pillar, i.e. voluntary private pensions has been 
established by the Law on Pension Funds, which came into force on Au-
gust 1, 1998.  
The Estonian pension scheme is composed of two schemes but a 
third one is under way. The two existing schemes are the State pension 
Scheme and the Voluntary Private Pensions Scheme, which is supported 
by the Government through tax deductions. A more detailed description of 
the Estonian pension scheme follows in Appendix 1. 
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2 EVALUATION OF THE  
   EXISTING SYSTEM 
 
The existing Estonian pension scheme today is in practice equal to the 
State Pension Scheme. The evaluation of the existing scheme therefore 
concerns only this scheme.  
 
 
2.1 Are pensions adequate?  
 
A survey1) comprising poverty in Estonia has been carried out recently. 
Internationally, in most poverty research the relative poverty line is con-
sidered to be 50% of the median of incomes and expenditures. In Es-
tonia this indicator in 1997 was 834 and 873 kroons respectively. Using 
the relative poverty criteria, Estonia had quite a good position amongst 
other countries since the share of poor households was on average only 
7–10% — comparable to EU countries.  
The situation is similar in other transition societies as well. In these 
societies, for a large part of the population the incomes are low (varying 
relatively little from the income median), and therefore the relative poverty 
line is abnormally low with few households falling below it. However, this is 
not really a true reflection of the actual situation, because in a poor soci-
ety, an income related to the income median may not meet the needs of 
the household. Keeping in mind the social development of society it is, 
according to the survey, better to take the absolute poverty line as  
the basis for socio-political regulations as regards the Estonian conditions, 
since this has been calculated in relation to the socio-economic situation 
of the country and it is adjusted at least once a year. According to 
calculations, as of 1997, the absolute poverty line resulting from Estonia's 
 
1) Kutsar, D and Trumm, A. (ed.)(1999) he aggregated data in 1997 from the Household  
    Income and Expenditure Study by the Statistical Office of Estonia is used in the survey. 
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socio-economic situation, was 1,250 kroons per household member 
(equivalence scales 1; 0.8; 0.8). The poverty line is a dynamic indicator 
which is adjusted annually, according to the change in cost of living. In 
1998, it would have been 1,330 kroons and as of February 1999 1,350 
kroons.  
The following results in table 1 reflect the situation of households in 
general and pensioner households in special in 1997.  
 
 
Table 1. Layered structure of household poverty (%). 
 
 
The poor and those living in poverty risk  
(% of population) 
 
Below poverty line, less than 1250 kr 
 
Out of  
poverty  
risk, over  
1501 kr 
 
   All 
In direct po-
verty, less 
than 1000 kr 
In poverty 
endangering 
coping, 1001–
1250 kr  
 
 
In area of 
poverty risk  
1251–1500 
kr   
All  house-
holds 
 
36.2% 18.1% 18.1% 16.6% 47.2% 
Pensioner 
household 
 
46.6% 
 
11.9% 
 
34.7% 
 
30.5% 
 
23.0% 
 
 
Almost one fifth of the households lived in direct poverty, one  
third lived below the poverty line, and half of the households lived either in 
poverty or in danger of poverty. For pensioner households the correspond-
ing figures are as follows: one tenth live in direct poverty, almost half  be-
low the poverty line  and more than three fourths of the pensioner house-
holds live either in poverty or in danger of poverty.  
As a first conclusion of the results of the study  the pension scheme 
reduces households living in direct poverty. This conclusion is supported 
by the fact that the national pension (minimum pension), which equals 800 
kroons a month, is received only by 1.5% of the pensioners.  
A second result of the household survey is that compared to all 
households one and a half time as many pensioner households live in 
poverty or in danger of poverty. Most frequently pensions vary from EEK 
1,000 to EEK 2,000. This is due to the fact that pensions until 1999 were 
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flat rated. Pensions depended only on years of pensionable service. In 
1999 the average years of pensionable service was 43 years including 
service periods credited as 2-3 times the actual service period. The actual 
years were around 39. The pension for an average working career is 
around EEK 1,500. 
Another study concerning subjective assessment of pensioners' 
economic situation has been made by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Statis-
tical Office of Estonia, University of Tartu, Institute of Applied Social  
Research Fafo (Norway)  in the survey "Living Conditions Study  
in Estonia. Baseline Report. NORBALT II" Tartu 2000. The economic  
self-assessment was divided into five categories. According to the study, 
of the pensioners in one person households two in ten felt that they were 
poor, three in ten felt that they were "not poor, but on the verge of poverty" 
and almost five of ten that they were "neither rich nor poor" and the rest, 
i.e. less than one in ten felt that they belonged to the two highest catego-
ries. Compared to actual income quintiles the greatest difference was in 
the lowest quintile because less than one in ten belonged to the lowest 
category. 
With the introduction of the accumulation part of the pension formula 
in 1999, the benefits are moving from a flat rate benefit towards an  
earnings- and contribution-related benefit. This change is in due time go-
ing to increase the range of the pension amount. The expected result in 
the future is an increasing number of pension households living out of 
poverty risk, but also an increasing number of households is expected to 
live in direct poverty (cf. Chart 1).  
 
Table 2.  Average monthly state pensions in 1995-99 and in the first half  
                  of the year 2000.  
  
 
EEK /month      1995    1996   1997   1998   1999 I/2000 
 
Old-age pension 670 953 1,110 1,247 1,545 1,543 
Superannuated pension 501 689 757 827 986 1,007 
Disability pension 536 706 797 902 1102 1,091 
Survivors' pension 447 559 613 692 840  841 
National pension 375 462 542 630 784 800 
  
TOTAL 637 889 1,027 1,152 1,426 1,427 
 
      Source:  Ministry of Social Affairs  
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The sufficiency of pensions may also be measured by comparing the 
replacement levels i.e. the average net pensions with average net earn-
ings. According to recommendations of ILO, Council of Europe and Euro-
pean Social Charter, the replacement rate should not be less than 40%. 
There has been an ongoing public discussion in Estonia concerning the 
replacement rate. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs the net re-
placement rate for the average old age pension in 1997 and 1998 was 
around 40% and in 1999  45%, for the average disability pension respec-
tively  a bit less than 30% and a bit over 30% and for the average national 
pension 20% respectively a bit  over 20%. Tables 2 and 3 show that the 
increase in the replacement rate from 1998 to 1999 is explained by the 
great increase in pensions from 1998 to 1999, which in turn is largely due 
to the elections in 1999. The rate decreased in the year 2000 because the 
pensions were not adjusted at all while wages increased. In fact the 
budget for the year 2000 was reduced from the year 1999 due to the aboli-
tion of corporate income tax. Even if the results for the old age pension 
are not bad on an average level, the individual rates vary considerably. 
They are good for low-income earners but not sufficient for high-income 
earners because of the lack of connection between wages and pension. A 
closer description is given in Chapter 2.3. 
 
 
Table 3. Average monthly gross wages 1993-99.  
 
 
 1993 1995 1998 1999 
 
   EEK/month 1,066 2,375 4,125 4,440 
 
  Source: Ministry of Social Affairs(2000)  
 
 
 
2.2 Is the coverage sufficient? 
 
There is no income ceiling of the contributions and the accumulation part 
of the benefits, with the exception that for self-employed persons the  
contribution and benefit are based on an income ceiling, which is 15 times 
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the minimum salary. The contribution is compulsory and pension accrues 
for all gainful employment. The minimum contribution for full-time work is 
based on the minimum salary, which is EEK 1,600 a month. For part-time 
employment and for self-employed persons the minimum contribution is 
based on minimum earnings equal to EEK 700 a month. 
State pensions are almost universally provided: national pensions  
to economically non-active and the employment-related pensions to  
economically active persons. The take-up ratio and coverage is almost 
100%. 
There are no comprehensive studies concerning the share of the 
grey market. Some rough estimates and speculations have been made 
resulting in 12-25%. According to data from the records of the Central 
Sickness Fund, in most cases a self-employed person contributes just on 
the minimum wage. In 1996, the number of self-employed persons was 
approximately 1.8% of the total number of the insured, while  
self-employed persons paid only 0.4% of the total social tax revenue -  
reflecting either that the income level of the self-employed is lower than 
the average, or that there has been evasion. 
 
 
2.3 Are pensions generous?  
 
A large share of PAYGO pensions in GDP is often considered as an  
indicator of generosity of a country's pension system. On the other hand,  
a higher level of development seems to be a precondition for a country  
to sustain a larger share of GDP for the financing of pensions. Poorer 
countries simply cannot afford high pension/GDP ratios. In Estonia the 
ratio has increased since 1992 with 60% from 5.3% to 8.6% in 1999. Ta-
ble 4 shows that in 1997 the ratio was 7.3%, whereas the average ratio in 
15 EU countries was almost the double. The ratio in two EU countries was 
less than in Estonia. The difference in the pension expenditure may par-
tially be explained by differences in the age structure of the country. 
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Table 4.  Pension expenditure and GDP in Estonia and 15 EU  
                  countries. 
  
 
 Estonia 15 EU countries 13 EU  
candidate 
countries 
 
1997 
 
Average 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Average 
 
  Pension expen- 
  diture as % of  
  GDP 
 
7.3 
 
13 
 
4.5 
 
16.8 
 
  GDP per head at  
  current price in  
  PPS 
7,100 19,400 12,800 33,700 7,000 
 
  Source: Statistics in Focus Theme 2-5/2001, Theme 3-6/2000, and the  
  Ministry of  Social Affairs in Estonia     
 
 
 
In 1997 the GDP per head at current price in PPS was in Estonia 
7,100, the average in 15 EU countries was nearly three times the  
Estonian, and the lowest in the EU countries was 12,800. Compared to 
the average of 13 EU candidate countries the GDP per head in Estonia 
was a bit higher in 1997 and in 1999 still higher. 
Generally speaking, the pension expenditure in GDP in Estonia was 
much lower than in the EU countries on average, but on an average  
level compared to other EU candidate countries. On the other hand also 
countries with much higher GDP per head than Estonia had lower pension 
expenditure. In Estonia the pension expenditure as % of GDP has  
increased since 1995 with the increase in GDP per head. The pension 
scheme in Estonia is not generous, but seen in relation to the resources of 
the country it cannot be considered as bad. 
Chart 1 shows the situation before the pension reform (the flat rate 
benefit) and the situation after some decades when the accumulation part 
is fully in force (the accumulation benefit). The two charts differ from each 
other only by the range of wage used. In 1999 three-fourth of employees 
earned less than 5,000 kroons a month. The left-hand-side chart shows 
how the state pension changes when the earnings level is 5,000 kroons or 
less. The right-hand-side chart includes the changes also for high-income 
earners. 
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Chart 1. The old employment- and new earnings-related pension  
                 for different wage levels with 15 or 40 years of service.  
 
 
The old scheme is generous to low income earners.  With 40 years 
of service and an income level equal to the average wage or less (EEK 
4,400 /month), the pension from the old scheme is EEK 1,460 while the 
pension in the new scheme is increasing with earnings from the minimum 
level of EEK 800 to EEK 1,460. The chart also shows that in the new 
scheme with earnings equal to the minimum wage or less, the earnings 
related pension does not depend at all on earnings. The pension is the flat 
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rate minimum. Also with 15 years of service and an income level equal to 
the average wage or less the pension is the flat rate minimum pension. 
On the other hand for high-income earners the replacement rate  
today is not good, which is shown in Chart 1 and Table 5. E.g. if the  
pensionable service is 40 years and the income level is twice the average 
wage the replacement rate for today’s flat rate pension is around 25% net 
(18% gross) and with the accumulation part around 40% net (30% gross). 
If the income level is four times the average level, the replacement rate 
today is about 10% but in the future with the accumulation part around 
36% net (25% gross). 
 
Table 5.  Replacement rates based on 40 years of service. 
 
    Earnings 
    EEK/month 
         Accumulation formula              Flat-rate formula 
  
Gross,% 
 
Net,% 
 
Gross,% 
 
 
Net,% 
1,600 50 68 91 123 
2,000 45 60 73 99 
4,000 34 46 36 49 
6,000 31 42 24 33 
8,000 29 39 18 25 
10,000 28 38 15 20 
12,000 27 37 12 16 
14,000 27 36 10 14 
16,000 27 36 12 9 
 
The target level of the state pension is 40-45% of net earnings. 
When comparing the target level and individual replacement rates, table 5 
shows that for earnings equal to twice the average wage or less  
the individual net replacement rates are 40% or more. With earnings  
according to the average and 40 years of accumulation, the replacement 
rate in 1999 figures would be 46% of which one fourth results from the 
base amount and almost three fourths of the accumulation part. With earn-
ings according to twice the average, the net replacement rate is 39% of 
which one fifth equals the base amount and four fifths results of the  
accumulation part. If the pensions in the future only are adjusted by the 
half-way index, the target level of the pension depends on how average 
earnings increase in relation to the half-way index.  
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2.4 Is the system efficient? 
 
For the time being there are two main schemes in Estonia, the State  
Pension Scheme and the Voluntary Private Pensions Scheme, which is 
supported by the Government by tax deductions. But there are also sub 
schemes, e.g. for privileged pensions. A third, partially voluntary, main 
scheme is under way. This second pillar is envisaged for 2002, and the 
scheme is suggested to be mandatory only for people currently under the 
age of 18. 
Characteristic for the State Pension Scheme is that there have been 
frequent amendments to the  scheme. The new Law on State Pension 
Insurance passed by Parliament in 1998 but entered into force on 1 April 
2000. Several amendments have been made since the law was passed,  
the latest on 13 December 2000. During the transition from the old State 
Allowances Act to the State Pension Insurance Act a lot of exceptions and 
special rules for certain years and certain groups have been made. The 
scheme is still looking for a balance in benefits for different groups and 
between the payers (employers) and the beneficiaries (employees). 
The new State Pension Scheme is transparent in the sense that 
contributions are paid and pension rights are acquired for everybody in 
gainful employment or self-employment including certain leaves.  
As all former Soviet countries Estonia has inherited certain privi-
leged pensions. Despite a new pension law, privileged pensions are still in 
use. E.g. old-age pensions on favourable terms are granted to persons 
who have worked under unhealthy or hard working conditions, 5-10 years 
before normal retirement age. Superannuated pensions are granted to 
prescribed professional groups whose professional abilities have declined 
before the normal pension age. These pensions are regulated by the Law 
on Superannuated Pensions and the Law on Old-age Pensions on Fa-
vourable Conditions. These special pensions are not consistent, and ac-
cording to the basic plan of the Government, these special conditions in 
the general scheme should be abolished.  
Also during the independence new privileged pensions have been 
introduced. Certain occupational groups have privileged pensions: 1) the 
President and the Members of Parliament (75% of the former salary based 
on 9 years of service), 2) State Audit officials and 3) judges. E.g. the high 
pensions (EEK 20,000 a month without tax deduction) for the members of  
Parliament has been recently debated. There are also special pension 
supplements for civil servants. As late as in June 2000, special pensions 
for military service were introduced, with a minimum level of 30% based 
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on 25 years of service and 2.5% for each additional year. There are also 
plans to introduce special pensions for policemen.   
 
 
2.5 Is the system well-targeted? 
 
When making comparisons, several different dependency ratios are  
available. Estonia is compared with other countries using the following  
dependency ratios. The total dependency ratio is used to describe the 
cost, which the young and the elderly cause for the active population. The 
ratio is calculated as the number of persons aged less than 20 or aged 
more than 64 in proportion to those aged 20-64. The old age dependency 
ratio is used to describe the cost of old-age pensions for the active popula-
tion. The ratio is calculated as the number of persons aged 65 or more 
divided by the number of persons aged 20-64. 
In EU only 36.3% of those aged 55-64 were working. Therefore, a 
third ratio is presented: the number of elderly (aged 55-64) in proportio to 
the active population (aged 20-64). 
 
 
Table 6.  Dependency ratios in Estonia, Finland and EU. 
 
 
 
 Total dependency 
ratio 
Old age depend-
ency ratio 
Elderly in proportion 
to active population 
 
   Estonia 0.67 0.24 0.19 
   Finland 0.65 0.25 0.18 
   EU 0.64 0.27 0.18 
 
   Source: The social situation in European Union 2000, Eurostat 2000 and  
   The Statistical Office in Estonia   
 
 
 
The table shows that when calculating the dependency ratios of the 
population the figures from Estonia do not  deviate much from figures from 
the EU or Finland. The total dependency ratio is a bit higher, but on the 
other hand the old age dependency ratio is a bit lower. The proportion of 
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elderly people in the population aged 20-64 is almost the same as in  
Finland and EU. These ratios show that today the age structure of  
the population in Estonia does not deviate much from the average age 
structure of the EU.  On the other hand, the age structure seems to 
change in the future. The total fertility rate has in Estonia dropped from 2.2 
in 1989 to 1.2 in 1999. The average in EU countries is 1.5 and in Finland 
1.7. If this trend continues it means that the active population in proportion 
to the old age population is decreasing faster than in the EU on average. 
On the contrary life expectancy has not increased in Estonia as rapidly as 
in EU countries in general. 
The ratio of pensioners to the insured in Estonia is also available be-
ing 0.64 in 1999. This ratio is almost as high  as the total dependency ra-
tio, which includes also young persons aged less than 20. The factors 
contributing to this high dependency ratio are the low retirement age, the 
low number of insured to the active population (69%) and the high number 
of pensioners in proportion to people aged 65 or more (181%).  The  
distribution of the pension expenditure in Estonia and in EU countries  
according to type of pension is shown in Chart 2.  The share of old age 
pension expenditure is remarkably high in Estonia, but it is not as shown 
in Table 6 explained by a high proportion of elderly to the active popula-
tion.  
In 2001 the retirement age is 63 years for men and 58 for women. 
Women's retirement age is gradually rising till 63 years by 2016. The  
ratio of old-age pensioners to the insured is 0.48. This is 2-3 times as high 
as the old age dependency ratio in Table 6. The number of old age  
pensioners nearly equals the number of people aged 60 or more. With the 
rising retirement age the number of old-age pensioner is decreasing.  
Statistics on actual retirement ages are not available, but from the above 
statistics one may assume that it is about 60 years. 
The following chart shows the distribution of pensioners according to 
the type of pension.  
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Table 7.  The distribution of pensioners according to the type of pension. 
 
 
       1990 
 
          2000      2001 
Old age pensioners 79.7% 76.6% 81.1% 
Superannuated  
pensioners 
0.5% 0.9% 0.9% 
Disability pensioners 10.8% 18.0% 11.8% 
Survivors' pensioners 4.8% 4.1% 4.3% 
National pensioners   *)    3.7% 0.4% 1.9% 
All pensioners 100% 100% 100% 
   
Number of all pensioners  360511 371354 366654 
  
*) includes persons receiving monthly benefit and personal pensioners,  
   national pensions did not exist in 1990 
 
     Source: The Statistical Office in Estonia   
 
 
 
Table 7 shows that the number of persons receiving a disability pen-
sion has nearly doubled from 1990 to 2000. The increase from 1990 to 
2000 in the number of disability pensions is explained by 
- the increase in the retirement age 
- changed age profile during 1990’s  
- increased  absolute number of young people receiving disability pen-
sions and at the same time increased life expectancy for disabled  
persons  
- increased unemployment. 
 
The new Law on State Pensions entered into force on 1 April 2000. 
The new law changed the statistics and especially the number of disability 
pensions. The three main reasons  for that are 
1) children who previously received an invalidity pension were transferred 
to receivers of the disabled child benefit 
2) persons beyond retirement age, who previously  received  invalidity 
pension were transferred to old age pensioners 
3) persons without a qualification period were transferred to receivers of 
the national pension. 
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Chart 2 shows the distribution of the pension expenditure in Estonia 
and 15 EU countries in 1997. In Estonia the expenditure in disability  
pensions and survivors' pensions were relatively small while the expendi-
ture in old age pensions was high. The high share of old-age pensions 
may be explained by the low retirement age and the wide range of special 
pensions, but not by the age structure (cf. Table 6). 
 
 
   Source:  Eurostat-ESSPROS and the Social Insurance Board in Estonia 
 
    Ireland (IRL), Iceland (IS), Estonia (EE), Norway (N), Spain (E), Portugal (P), 
    United Kingdom (UK), Denmark (DK), Greece (EL), Finland (FIN), Belgium (B),  
    Sweden (SWE), Germany (D), Netherlands (NL), France (F), Austria (A), Italy (I) 
 
 
Chart 2. The pension expenditure in 1997 according to type of pension  
                 as % of GDP in Estonia and 15 EU countries. 
 
 
2.6 Is the system equitable? 
 
With the introduction of the accumulation part of the pension formula the 
benefits are moving from a flat rate benefit depending only on the years  
of pensionable service to an earnings- and contribution related scheme. 
Still the accumulation part cannot be expressed as a replacement rate of 
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wages. The reason is that the pension accrues according to the individual 
salary in proportion to the average salary, but the value of the pension 
depends on the value of a pension insurance coefficient, which will be ad-
justed yearly by the half-way index. The final benefit depends on how the 
value of the pension insurance coefficient changes compared to the aver-
age salary. If the proportion remains constant also in the future the accu-
mulation part will correspond to an accrual rate of 0.6% of wages (0.8% of 
net wages).  
For decades on, the changes from a flat rate pension to an earnings-
related pension result in differences in the different cohorts' average  
pensions.  The fact that salaries are highest in the age bracket 25-40 and 
declines after that contributes to the differences.  
According to the Statistical Office of Estonia men's pensions are in 
average only 5-6% higher than those of women. As the pensions  
until now only have depended on the time of service, the somewhat lower 
pensions of women are explained by the fact that women in general have 
a shorter time of service due to a lower retirement age. 
 
 
2.7 Is the system sustainable? 
Financial sustainability 
 
The pension contribution is intended to remain on the level of 20%. The 
level is not based on actual calculations, it is just taken to be acceptable. 
As long as the pensions are adjusted depending on financial constraints, 
one may consider the scheme as financially sustainable. Another question 
is whether the level of the pension is adequate.  
The increase in retirement age contributes to the sustainability,  
provided that the increased retirement age does not essentially increase 
the number of disability pensions. From the year 2002 on, the pensions 
will be adjusted by a half-way index following the growth of CPI and the 
revenue of social tax. The increase of the revenue of social tax is very well 
tied to the economic growth but inflation may be high when the economic 
growth is low, which may cause problems in the financing of pensions.  
On the other hand, during high economic growth, inflation may be low  
resulting in low pensions compared to wages. Considering the country as 
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a whole, adjusting pensions by an inflation part smoothens the economic 
fluctuations. 
By adjusting pensions with a pre-determined index the pension  
expenditure and contributions are not very closely tied to each  
other anymore. In this situation adverse demographics may in the  
long-term result in problems in financing the state pensions. Decreasing 
mortality means that people live longer and that pension expenditure  
increases. Low birth rates and high emigration of young people means 
that the workforce is decreasing compared to the old-age population,  
resulting in financing problems of the state pension scheme or reduced 
pension benefit.  
The State Pension Scheme does not include a buffer fund covering 
situations of declining contributions due to economic fluctuation. Without a 
proper buffer fund there may be yearly problems in paying the pensions 
out of the pension contributions (C.f. also Chapter 3.2.4). For the time  
being a stabilisation fund connected to the state budget may be used. In 
the future at least three possible choices are available: 
- raising the level of contribution  
- introducing a buffer fund for economic and demographic risks 
- cutting pension benefits.   
 
Political sustainability  
 
The Government has been reforming the pension scheme since 1997 and 
the Law on State Pensions was adopted in 1998. Since then, several 
amendments to the law have been made.  
The process could be described as an ongoing search for a  
satisfactory balance between pension expenditure/benefit and pension 
contributions and in benefits between different groups.  
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2.8 Does the private sector play a role in 
      pensions provision?  
 
For the time being the private sector plays an almost non-existent role in 
pension provision. The state pensions are administrated by the public sec-
tor.  
The second pillar scheme with privately managed pension funds is 
envisaged for 2002. 
Legal framework for voluntary private pensions (so called third pillar) 
was established by the Law on Pension Funds, which is in force from Au-
gust 1, 1998.  
Participation in supplementary voluntary pension schemes can take 
two forms: 
• pension insurance policies offered by licensed private insurance  
companies;  
• units of pension funds managed by private fund managers.  
 
By the end of 2000 ca. 4% of all employed persons had concluded a  
private pension contract with a life insurance company. 
 
 
2.9 Is the system distortive? 
 
The level of payroll taxation is quite moderate but the level of pension is 
not very good either. With the reform the accumulation part was in 1999 
added to the pension benefit formula, the level of the pension compared to 
other insured is directly depending on paid contributions: the higher the 
contributions, the higher the pension. For low-income earners or persons 
with short periods of qualifying service there is no incentive to contribute to 
the pension scheme.  The result is in all cases the minimum pension as is 
shown in Chart 1.  There would be a possibility to increase the incentive 
also for low-income earners by introducing a gradually decreasing  
minimum pension towards increasing earnings-related pension as shown 
in Chart 3. E.g. in Finland and partially in Sweden such an incentive is 
used. 
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Chart 3.  The new state pension benefit and a possible alternative  
                  benefit increasing the incentive for low-income earners. 
 
 
As regards the average and high-income earners the accumulation 
part would be a good incentive for the employees to contribute to the  
pension scheme, but actually only the employers contribute to the pension 
scheme. A still better incentive would be a closer relation between  
earnings and pension. This is possible to achieve by decreasing or  
abolishing the base amount and replacing it by a higher pension insurance 
coefficient. The accumulation part is recorded individually, and it is in the 
interest of employees that the supervision of the employer's contributions 
is effective. An employee has also the possibility to verify that contribu-
tions have been paid for him or her. Even if the pension is not deferred 
after retirement age according to the State Pension Law, the possibility to 
accumulate pension from earnings also in retirement is an incentive to 
work after retirement age. 
There is nowadays a link between the wages or more precisely  
between the contribution and the pension through the accumulation  
part, provided that the pension exceeds the minimum pension. For the 
future accrual one may say that the pension is directly proportional to the 
contributions paid but the amount of EEK payable is not determined from 
the individual contribution. The actual amount depends on the value of the 
pension insurance coefficient and its relation to the average wage.  
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2.10 Is the system administratively  
        effective? 
 
The regional offices (16 offices and 550 employees) proceed state  
pension applications, grant pensions and arrange the payment of  
pensions through banks and post offices. The voluntary private pension 
scheme was introduced a couple of years ago. Therefore there are hardly 
no pensions paid from this scheme. Considering the situation in the future 
with two or three different schemes, the insured has to make different 
pension applications in order to receive all pensions from the different 
schemes.  If there is no collaboration between the different schemes the 
insured may also have difficulties to obtain information on his/her total 
pension. 
Information concerning the pension scheme is quite easy to obtain 
from the Internet (www.sm.ee and www.ensib.ee). The constraint is 
probably that the use of the Internet is not yet widely spread. On the other 
hand the target in Estonia is that the proportion of the Internet users in a 
few years is the highest in the world (Source: radio news in March 2001). 
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3 EVALUATION OF RECENT 
   CHANGES AND REFORMS  
   IN THE PENSION SYSTEM  
3.1 The overall assessment  of the State  
      Pension Scheme  
 
The main principles of the State Pension Insurance Act are: 
- equalisation of the same pensionable age of men and women by 2016 
at 63 years of age; 
- provision for early retirement (pension shall be reduced by 0.4% for 
each relevant month); 
- implementation of a standard basis for the calculation of old-age, inca-
pacity and survivors'   pensions; 
- division of the pension formula into three units: basic unit, length of 
service unit and insurance  unit; 
- calculation of pensionable length of service on the basis of calculated 
or paid social tax; 
- establishment of pension eligibility and length of pension insurance 
requirement for incapacity   pensions  and survivors' pensions; 
- setting up a pension insurance register  
- the possibility to accumulate pension from earnings also when  retired 
- no ceiling for neither contributions nor benefits 
 
The State Pension Scheme could still be improved by  
- increasing the link between contributions and benefits by abolishing 
the base amount and replacing it by a higher insurance amount 
- increasing the incentive for low income earners and self-employed 
persons to contribute to the scheme by introducing a gradually  
decreasing guarantee amount towards increasing earnings-related  
pension (c.f. Chart 3) 
- introducing a buffer fund against economic and demographic risks  
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- continuing to raise the retirement age or introducing a life-expectancy-
component. The life expectancy for elderly people is probably going to 
continue to increase 
- removing special conditions and privileged pensions from the general 
pension scheme.  
 
Until now the state pension has been generous to low income  
earners, because the pension has not been depending on the earnings.  
In addition to a base amount, the pension accrues in the future only  
in proportion to each individual's earnings. A minimum pension is  
still guaranteed, but otherwise the state pension will not in general be 
generous to anyone. The target level of the state pension is 40 % of one’s 
net earnings. There is therefore a need for either an increased level of the 
state pensions or additional pension schemes. By developing additional 
pension schemes the risk of the scheme is dispersed. On the other hand 
there may arise co-ordination problems with several schemes, like the 
feasibility of the minimum pension pointed out in Chapter 3.2 (page 26). 
The proposed additional second pillar scheme is voluntary except for peo-
ple currently aged  less than 18 years. This voluntariness usually means 
that those better off join the schemes but low-income insured do not, re-
sulting in poverty among pensioner households. 
 
 
3.2 The evaluation of the second pillar  
      scheme 
 
The new system is proposed to be compulsory for new entrants but  
voluntary for others. The reform may improve labour market incentives  
because only active labour market participation accumulates the pension. 
According to a poll (Koskinen, E. (2000)), when the scheme earlier was 
proposed to be voluntary for everyone, 40% expressed willingness to join 
the scheme. Employees, both men and women may join the scheme but 
the self-employed may not. Instead they have the possibility to complete 
their state pension by a voluntary private pension in the third pillar 
scheme.  
The proposed second pillar covers only old age pensions.  
The scheme does not at all cover the social risks of unemployment and 
disability and only partially the death of a breadwinner. Hence the  
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replacement level for the disability pension will remain small and so will 
the old age pension for disabled and unemployed persons. On the other 
hand, the State Pension is in case of disability or death of breadwinner 
calculated as if a contribution equal to 20% had been paid to the State 
Pension Scheme all the time. 
The proposed second pillar scheme is a fully funded, defined  
contribution scheme. Funded pensions are protected as vested rights but 
tax-privileges may change. Adverse demographics affects the scheme but 
indirectly and less than in a PAYG defined benefit scheme: 
- in a situation where the active population declines (low birth rate or 
high emigration) compared to pensioners the value of the funded  
assets may decrease, especially if greater amounts of the funded as-
sets need to be realised during a short period 
- if mortality especially for elderly is declining, it means that  life expec-
tancy is increasing. Increased life expectancy means lower pensions in 
a defined contribution scheme. 
 
The new system is transparent in the sense that the benefit is  
calculated on the basis of actually paid contributions and returns from the 
invested contributions. When looking at the state pension scheme and the 
second pillar scheme together it seems to be favourable for low-income 
earners. According to statistics from the Ministry of Social Affairs, one 
fourth of full time employees earn less than 2,000 kroons a month. In 
the new system these employees will receive from the state scheme a 
minimum pension, which is higher than the actually earned pension,  
and an additional pension from the second pillar scheme. Should e.g. the 
minimum pension be shared by the two systems? In Sweden there is a 
shared guarantee (minimum) pension for the statutory PAYG-system and 
the statutory fully funded system. The benefit from the fully funded system 
is calculated theoretically as if the return from savings equals the index in 
the PAYG-system. 
If the proposed scheme was immediately compulsory for everyone, 
approximately 1,000 million kroons (1.3 % of GDP) would be funded 
yearly and when the scheme at the end of this century is fully in force  
approximately an amount equal to 40-50 % of GDP is funded in the  
second pillar scheme. On the other hand the introduction of the second 
pillar scheme will cause deficit in financing the pensions. Of the contribu-
tion (20 %) to the state pension scheme an amount equal to 4 %  
of the wages is transferred to the new scheme. As the state pensions are 
financed on a PAYG basis the revenue to the state scheme will not be 
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enough during the next 50 years. The deficit is further increased by  
the fact that insured joining the new scheme retain their right to receive a 
disability and survivors' pension from the state pension scheme according 
to a contribution corresponding to 20%.    
According to a discussion paper (The Second Pillar Pension 
Scheme(2000)) the implicit pension debt in 1998 is estimated to 121,000 
million kroons, which equals 168% of GDP.  If everyone would join the 
new scheme the deficit during the next 50 years due to transferring out  
4% from the state pension scheme is approximately 24,200 million kroons 
or in proportion to GDP 33.6%. The yearly deficit is thus nearly 1% of GDP 
and if e.g. 50% of the insured are joining the new scheme the yearly deficit 
thus nearly 0.5% of GDP. According to the discussion paper possible 
measures to finance the deficit are: 
- measures to supplement the contribution 
- finance certain pension benefits out of the state budget 
- create a reserve fund for the state pension insurance budget 
- use the stabilisation fund which is connected to the state budget and 
other additional means 
- issue foreign or domestic state bonds.  
 
Considering the risks related to PAYG-financed and fully funded 
schemes the new system diversifies the risk by offering a fully funded 
scheme which completes the PAYG-financed state pension scheme. 
In the new scheme the choice of pension fund is determined by the 
individual. The individual may in the beginning of each year choose  
the pension fund for new savings and change pension fund for already  
invested savings. Thus the system offers a possibility to diversify invest-
ment risks and it is the choice of the participant to decide whether yearly 
contributions should be  invested in the same or different pension funds 
 
 
3.3 The organisation of the reform process 
 
The proposed new system has been publicly debated from the beginning 
and the lack of political consistency and consensus has delayed the  
reform. 
 
28 
The Reform Commission originally had 5 members and it was an 
expert commission chaired by an economic advisor of the Prime Minister, 
the members were from  the National Social Insurance Board, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Health Insurance Fund and  one politician, the former 
chairman of the social commission of Parliament. 
Currently, the Commission has 6 members: It is chaired by the 
Minister of Social Affairs, and its  members are the Minister of Finance 
and experts from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Social Affairs and the 
Social Insurance Board. 
Representatives of the labour market organisations have not been 
members  of the commission but obviously the social partners have got a 
due hearing in the commission. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Estonian Pension System 
1 General overview of the pension system 
 
The Estonian pension scheme is composed of two schemes but a third 
one is under way. The two existing schemes are the State pension 
Scheme and the Voluntary Private Pensions Scheme, which is supported 
by the Government through tax deductions.   
The “Concept paper of the Pension Reform” was approved in 1997. 
The Estonian Government has been reforming its pension system since 
that. The paper suggested the introduction of a three-pillar pension 
scheme, where the pillars have the following meaning: 
 
I pillar  -  compulsory state managed pension scheme financed on a  
               pay-as-you go basis. 
II pillar  - compulsory privately managed funded pension scheme 
III pillar - voluntary private pension schemes. 
 
The reform of the first pillar was initiated with the adoption of the 
new Law on Social Tax, which entered into force on January 1, 1999 fol-
lowed by the Law on State Pension Insurance which took effect on April 1, 
2000. The second pillar is envisaged for 2002, but deviating from the 
original plan this scheme is suggested to be mandatory only for those cur-
rently under the age of 18 and voluntary for all other employees. The legal 
framework for the third pillar, i.e. voluntary private pensions has been es-
tablished by the Law on Pension Funds, which came into force on August 
1, 1998.  
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2 The First Pillar: State Pension benefits 
 
The State Pension benefits can be divided into two groups: employment-
related and national pensions. The  state pension benefits cover social 
risks related to old age, invalidity and death of the family earner. From the 
year 1999 on, the employment-related benefits are gradually moving from 
a benefit related to the pensionable length of service, to an earnings-  
and contribution-related benefit. The employment-related benefits are the 
Old-Age pension, the Pension for Incapacity for Work and Survivors' pen-
sions. The purpose of the social or national pension is to guarantee a 
minimum income for persons who are not entitled to an employment-
related benefit. 
 
2.1 Organisation, financing and taxation 
 
The National Social Insurance Board  including 60 employees is a state 
institution in the area of government of the  Ministry of Social Affairs. This 
Board administrates the state pension scheme. As a structural unit of the 
National Social Insurance Board, a State Pension Insurance Register  
has been established. The Register keeps individual data on the insured 
persons, including the amount of social tax paid on their behalf.  
The 16 regional pension offices  with a total of 550 employees  are subor-
dinated to the National Social Insurance Board. The regional offices pro-
ceed pension applications, grant pensions and arrange the payment of 
pensions through banks and post offices. 
The State Pension benefits are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
The main part of the scheme is  financed by employers' contributions but a 
minor part of the scheme is financed by general taxation.   
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a) Social tax:  
A contribution of 33% of the tax base (consists mainly of gross wages) is 
paid by the employers and the self-employed. 20 percentage points are 
used for  the national pension and for the employment/contribution-related 
pensions: Old-Age, Incapacity for work and Survivors' pensions. There is 
no income ceiling of contributions and benefits, with the exception that for 
self-employed persons the income ceiling is 15 times the minimum salary. 
The contribution is compulsory for all gainful employment. The state pays 
social tax on a fixed amount (currently EEK 700  a month) on behalf of the 
following groups  
- one of the parents on parental leave with an up to 3-year-old child or 
one of the non-working parent raising an up to 3 year-old child 
- non-working spouse of a diplomat working at a foreign representation 
- conscript of the defence forces 
- disabled person working in special production establishment for the  
disabled 
- persons receiving unemployment allowances 
 
The employers and self-employed persons pay the total rate of  
social tax to the account of the Tax Office, declaring the amount of social 
tax paid on behalf of each insured person separately. The Tax Office fur-
ther transfers 20 percentage points of the social tax into the state pension 
insurance budget. The state pension insurance budget is adopted annu-
ally by the Parliament as a separate part of the general state budget. 
 
b) General taxation: 
Expenditures not related to the insurance principle are financed out of the 
general taxes. In particular this concerns 
- pension supplements for civil servants, politically repressed persons 
and war veterans (old-age and survivors)  
- administrative costs of pension offices 
 
State pensions do not constitute  taxable income, but there is a dis-
cussion around this subject. As late as in December 2000 the Parliament 
decided to reject the proposal of the Government to start taxation of pen-
sions exceeding EEK 4000.  
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2.2 The General Benefit Formulas 
 
a)   
Employment- and earnings-related benefits    
 
 
               B + S  x  s + a  x  I  
 
 
In the formula "B" is the base amount, "S" is the value of one year of pen-
sionable length of service and "I" is the value of the pension insurance 
coefficient. The value of "B" is determined by the Parliament,  whereas the 
values of "S" and "I" are set by the Government. 
The value of "B" is EEK 410 /month and the values of "S" and "I" are 
set as EEK 27.40 /month (from April 1, 2001). However there is no 
amendment where it is explicitly stated that the values should be equal. 
The reason for using different letters in the formula is that during the 
preparation of the law some decision makers thought that "I" should have 
a higher value than "S". 
 
"s" is the years of insurance until December 31, 1998. When summing up 
the periods of pensionable service the result is rounded to full years. The 
pensionable service includes the following periods: 
- working as a family member of a self-employed person 
- military service 
- studies at the institutions of higher education or professional schools 
- caring for a severely disabled adult family member or a disabled child 
- caring for a child during the first two years 
- periods of registered unemployment  
- membership of liberal arts associations or professional societies 
- serving a congregation or a registered religious organisation 
- 2 years are added for each child raised to one of the parents insur-
ance record 
- periods of unlawful repression count threefold 
 
"a" is the sum of pension insurance coefficients from  January 1, 1999. 
A pension insurance coefficient for a certain year is calculated as the  
quotient of social tax registered for an individual and the average social 
tax registered for the year in question. For a part-time employee the  
minimum social tax is based on at least EEK 700 a month even if the  
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salary actually paid is less and for a full-time employee at least based on 
the minimum wage (EEK 1,600 /month). For employees there is no ceiling 
of the social tax but for self-employed persons the ceiling is 15 times the 
minimum wage. The minimum contribution for self-employed persons is 
based on EEK 700 a month. 
With the introduction of the accumulation part of the formula the 
benefits are moving from a flat rate benefit depending only on the years of  
pensionable service to an earnings- and contribution related scheme. Still 
the accumulation part can't be expressed as a replacement rate of wages. 
This is because the pension is earned in proportion to the average salary 
and the final benefit depends on what the value of the pension insurance 
coefficient is compared to the average salary. If the proportion would  
remain constant also in the future the accumulation part corresponds to an 
accrual rate of 0.6% of wages. 
 
b)  
National Pensions 
All national pension benefits are related to the national pension rate which 
is set to EEK 800 /month (years 2000 and 2001). 
 
2.3 Adjustment 
 
Both the base amount and the national pension rates are set by the  
Parliament when adopting the annual state budget. There has been no 
automatic adjustment. Pensions are recalculated once a year on 1 April. 
The increase depends on the financial constraints of the pension  
insurance budget. One could say that the accumulating rights increase at 
the rate of increase in the total revenue of social tax in proportion to the 
increase of pension expenditure. 
On December 13, 2000 the Parliament adopted the amendments to 
the State Pension Insurance Act, which included index adjustment rules.  
From April 1, 2002, both national and employment related pensions will   
be adjusted by an index.  The index is determined as the average of the 
increase in CPI and  the increase in total revenues of social tax. 
With the introduction of an index-adjustment of pensions the State  
Pension Benefits are moving back from a kind of collective contribution  
defined scheme towards a benefit defined scheme. 
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2.4 Employment- and earnings-related pension 
2.4.1 Old-age pension 
 
Eligibility 
Old-age pensions are available for permanent residents of Estonia and 
aliens with temporary residents permits. The minimum period of member-
ship is 15 years of pensionable  service or accumulation period in Estonia. 
 
Benefit  
The benefit is calculated according to the general benefit formula. Years of 
pensionable service were until the end of 1998  determined according to 
years of insurance noted as "s" in the general benefit formula. From 1999 
on as insured for the whole year are considered persons for whom at least 
a contribution corresponding to the minimum yearly salary is paid. If the 
contribution is less, then only a part of the year is credited as insurance 
period. The part is the proportion of the contribution paid, and the contribu-
tion corresponding to the minimum salary. If the pension calculated is 
smaller than the National Pension, the amount corresponding to the Na-
tional Pension is awarded 
 
Retirement age 
In 2001 the retirement age is 63 years for men and 58 for women. 
Women's retirement age is gradually rising till 63 years by 2016. 
 
Special pensions 
- Old age pension on favourable conditions: persons who have worked  
      under unhealthy or hard working conditions, 5-10 years before normal 
      retirement age 
- superannuated pensions: prescribed professional groups whose  
professional abilities have declined before the normal pension age 
 
These pensions are regulated by the Law on Old-age Pensions on  
Favourable Conditions and the Law on Superannuated Pensions. These 
special pensions are not consistent, and according to the basic plan of the 
Government, one should get rid of the special conditions in the general 
scheme. 
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Early retirement 
- up to 3 years before retirement age 
- the amount of pension is reduced by 0.4 per cent for each month of 
early retirement 
 
Deferment 
-    no provision 
 
Accumulation with earnings 
-    full accumulation with earnings 
 
Working  
Working pensioners are entitled to a full pension regardless of their  
work income with the exception that early retirement pensions and special 
pensions are not paid to working persons. The amount of pension earned 
during retirement is automatically added to the pension on  1 April of the 
following year. 
 
2.4.2  Work Incapacity Pension 
 
Definitions 
- Invalidity is certified by a medical commission and expressed in  
percentages. 
- Work incapacity pension is granted if permanent incapacity is at least 
40 per cent. 
 
Field of application 
Permanent residents of Estonia and temporary residents during the valid-
ity of their residence permit 
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Conditions  
1) Minimum level of incapacity for work: incapacity of 40% 
2) Period for which cover is given 
      From the date when the state of invalidity is certified by the medical   
      commission: 
      - up to April 1, 2000: no age limit 
      - from April 1, 2000: from 16 years up to the statutory retirement age 
3) From April 1, 2000 the minimum qualification period giving entitlement 
to benefits is depending on the age, ranging from 1 year for persons 
aged 21 to 23 years to 14 years for persons aged 60 to 62 years. 
Benefits 
For calculation of the amount of pension, firstly the following 2 amounts 
are compared: 
- pension calculated on the basis of the existing pensionable length of 
service and insurance coefficient of the applicant using the general 
pension formula 
- pension calculated on the basis of 30 years of pensionable length of 
service 
 
The higher of these  two is then multiplied with the percentage,  
corresponding to the degree of incapacity of the person (from 40% to 
100%). However, it is further stipulated that the amount of the work inca-
pacity pension may not be less than the amount of the National Pension.   
 
Working 
Working pensioners are entitled to a pension regardless of their work in-
come, but working, of course, may affect the degree of work incapacity.  
 
2 4.3  Survivors' pension 
 
For eligibility to the survivors' pension, the same qualification period as  
for work incapacity pensions (depending on the age of the breadwinner) is 
applied. 
 
Survivors' pensions are paid in the case of the loss of breadwinner to: 
1) children, brothers, sisters or grandchildren under 18 years of age (24 if 
studying) 
2) widow, if the marriage has lasted for 5 years or parent who is in  
retirement age or permanently disabled 
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3) divorced spouse who has reached the retirement age or became  
permanently disabled within 3 years from divorce, if the marriage has 
lasted at least 25 years  
4) one of the parents, widow or guardian, who is non-working and raises 
an under 14-years old child of the deceased breadwinner 
 
If the breadwinner received a pension, the benefit rate equals this  
pension. Otherwise the benefit rate is calculated in the same way as for 
work incapacity pensions with the exception that there is no minimum 
amount. The survivors' benefit is 
1) 100 % of  the benefit rate for 3  or more family members 
2) 70 % of the benefit rate for two family members 
3) 40 % of the benefit rate for one family member 
 
Working pensioners are not entitled to a pension 
  
2.4.4  Pension supplements 
 
To old-age pensions, work incapacity pensions are the following pension 
supplement added to persons who's work incapacity is at least 40%: 
1) 25 % of the national pension rate due to injury or illness related to mili-
tary service 
2) 10% of the national pension rate due to nuclear disaster, -test or -
accident 
3) 20 % of the national pension rate due to participation in the Second 
World War 
4) 100% of the national pension rate due to participation in the Estonian 
War of independence 1918-19. 
 
The pension supplements are also added to survivors' pensions granted 
to families of the above listed persons. The pension supplements are fi-
nanced out of the State Budget.  
 
2.5 National pension 
 
The national pension is regarded as a minimum pension guarantee. Enti-
tled are residents of Estonia 
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1) at the age of 63 (both men and women), who have lived in Estonia for 
at least five years prior to the claiming of a pension, who lack the quali-
fication period of 15 years required for the old age pension and who do 
not receive pension from any other state 
2) persons with permanent incapacity for work at least 40 percent lacking 
required qualification period 
3) survivors whose breadwinner lacked the qualification period required 
for survivors' pension. 
 
National pensions are not granted if the person receives pension from any 
other state and national pensions are not paid to working persons 
Benefits 
- 100% of National pension rate  for individuals eligible under point 1 
- the National pension rate is multiplied by the percentage of work inca-
pacity under point 2 
- under point 3 the benefit is: 
a) 100 % of  the national pension rate for 3  or more family members 
b)   70 % of the national pension rate for two family members 
c) 40 % of the national pension rate for one family member 
 
 
3 The Second Pillar:  Privately managed  
   funded pensions    
 
The second pillar is envisaged for 2002. The concept paper of the pension 
reform was elaborated by the Social Insurance Reform Committee and 
adopted in 1997. Differing from the one originally proposed, the scheme is 
now proposed to be mandatory only for those currently under the age of 
18, and voluntary for all other employees. The draft law has past the first 
reading of the Parliament in May 2001, but the second reading of the draft 
law in June 2001 was interrupted. The reading will be continued in  
Septerber 2001.  
The proposed second pillar pension scheme includes only old age 
pensions. This scheme does not cover the social risks related to disability 
and only partially death of the family earner. These risks are covered only 
by the first pillar scheme. 
According to the proposal employees who pay an additional 2% of 
their gross wage on their individual account in a pillar 2 pension fund are 
41 
granted an amount of 4 percentage points of the social tax paid by the 
employer. At the same time the contribution-related component of the pil-
lar 1 benefit formula is reduced proportionally. Contributions paid by the 
employer into the first pillar on behalf of employees who do not choose the 
second pillar, will remain at 20%. Their pension benefits will only depend 
on the State Pension Scheme. 
Further the proposal includes that applications for joining the second 
pillar should be submitted at least 2 months preceding every new financial 
year (by 1 November at the latest). People are not allowed to switch back 
from the second pillar. Collection of the contributions to the second pillar 
starts from January 1st, 2002. 
Second pillar contributions are collected together with the social tax 
by the Tax Board. The employer withholds 2% of the individual contribu-
tion. Contributions are registered on individual accounts by Central Regis-
ter for Securities (CRS). The money is transferred to the pension fund 
chosen by the individual.  
When retiring, pension benefits are paid by life insurance companies  
as lifelong annuities. If the accumulated funds of the individual exceed a 
preset amount, the individual may choose to take additional sums out as a 
programmed withdrawal from the management company of the pension 
fund (not necessary life-long). However, assets can not be paid immedi-
ately as a lump sum. If the insured dies before the retirement age 63, the 
units of the fund are inherited. After retirement age possible left assets 
from programmed withdrawals is inherited, whereas possible assets left 
from life-long annuities are not (unless a guarantee period is agreed at the 
time of purchasing the annuity). 
A guarantee system and a Guarantee Fund is attached to the 
scheme. The Financial Surveillance Authority (after uniting the present 
three separate authorities) will carry out the supervision of the scheme. 
 
By nature and institutional framework the second and third pillar pension 
funds are similar, with the following exemptions: 
4) Management companies must apply for a special license; 
5) Additional requirements regarding management and financial position 
for the management company; 
6) Additional requirements for the depository bank; 
7) Compulsory participation on the pension fund for the management 
company – depends on volumes of the fund, functions as a reserve; 
8) Compulsory payments to the Guarantee Fund for the management 
company; 
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9) Limits to management fee, depository fee and other expenses  on be-
half of the pension fund; 
10)  Limitations to marketing costs and activities; 
 
Additional limitations on investments by instruments. Amounts on in-
vestments to the EU are not limited, but they have to follow the structure 
of limits on different instruments. 
 
Taxation 
The current proposal is that only the amount (I and II pillar together) ex-
ceeding 3 times the non-taxable threshold (from 2001 the non-taxable 
threshold is EEK 1,000 a month) is subject to income tax (26%). 
 
 
4 The Third Pillar: Voluntary private  
   pensions  
 
The legal framework of the third pillar was enacted by the Pension Funds 
Act (from 10 June 1998, entered into force 1 August 1998). This law also 
simultaneously made substantial amendments to the Insurance Act and 
the Income Tax Act. 
 
Participation in supplementary voluntary pension schemes can take two 
forms: 
• pension insurance policies offered by licensed private insurance  
companies;  
• units of pension funds managed by private fund managers.  
 
The third pillar is centred on the individual. Government policy  
concerning the voluntary supplementary pension arrangements has been 
in favour of individual-centred solutions over the occupational schemes  
to avoid obstacles to labour mobility given the small size of the Estonian 
labour force. 
In fact, there is a basic legal framework (the Wage Act and  
Collective Agreements Act), which allows employers to establish schemes 
providing supplementary benefits of social security nature to their  
employees. However, as these benefits do not enjoy favourable tax treat-
ment (i.e. contributions are taxable with income tax and social tax, benefits 
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are taxable with the income tax), the occupational schemes are not devel-
oped by employers. 
 
Tax incentives 
To encourage participation in the voluntary private pension schemes, the 
following tax incentives have been introduced : 
- contributions (premiums paid on the bases of pension insurance policy 
or sums paid for purchasing the units of a private pension fund) are 
deductible from the income taxable with the income tax up to the limit 
of 15 % of the annual income; 
- benefits paid on the bases of a private pension insurance policy or 
from redemption of the units of a pension fund are taxable at a lower 
rate (10%) of income tax, instead of the normal rate of 26% ; 
- benefits paid regularly lifelong on the bases of defined-benefit type 
pension insurance policy in equal or increasing amounts are not  
taxable.  
 
When participating in the voluntary schemes, the pension age is a 
matter of contract between the person and the insurance company, except 
that the minimum contractual age, in which case the tax exceptions apply, 
is 55 years. 
 
In conclusion, the III pillar is characterised by the following features : 
- voluntary participation ; 
- individual-centred ; 
- private management ; 
- pre-funding financing principle ; 
- free choice between the insurance and the fund instrument ; 
- free choice between the defined-benefit and the defined-contribution 
type schemes ; 
- strong tax incentives provided by the state.  
 
There are currently 6 life insurance companies in Estonia, 5 of them 
have a license to sell pension insurance policies under favourable tax 
treatment. In March 1999, the first fund manager (Hansa Asset Manage-
ment) obtained a license to run a private pension fund (Hansa Pension 
Fund). In November 2000, the second pension fund (Pension Fund of the 
Estonian Union Bank) was licensed. 
By the end of 2000, ca 25,000 persons (ca. 4% of all employed  
persons) had concluded a private pension contract with a life insurance 
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company. In 2000, the premiums collected by insurance companies under 
pension insurance policies accounted for EEK 117 million. By the end of 
2000,  the assets of the Hansa Pension Fund reached EEK 12 million and 
the number of participants was ca. 400. The assets of the Pension Fund of 
the Estonian Union Bank were EEK 5 million .  
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Appendix 2 
Key figures 
 
Population (1.1.2000)  1,439,000 
-aged 0-19      366,508 (25%) 
-aged 20-59      780,584 (54%) 
-aged 60-64        83,531 (  6%) 
-aged 65+      208,574 ( 15%)  
Employed persons     610,000  (58.5% of the Work 
Force) 
Unemployed        86,200  (12.4% of the Work 
Force) 
Insured persons     596,500 
Number of pensioners     371,354 
- Old-age      284,327 
- Disability        66,814 
- Widow's pension       15,318 
 
Life expectancy at age 60  males females 
1989   15.3   19.7 
1999   15.3   20.8 
 
Total fertility rate 
1989     2.2 
1999   1.2 
 
Exchange rate Dec. 2000  1 Euro =  EEK 15.6466  
 
Purchasing Power Parity (international dollars) 1998: 5.5 
 
 
 
